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INTRODUCTION

In an increasing number of communities throughout the
country, television viewers must depend on government-owned
and controlled cable television systems for vital communications
services. While perhaps relatively unremarkable when cable
television was barely more than an antenna service delivering a
minimum of local television signals to households deprived of
adequate off-the-air reception, governmental ownership of this
communications medium has become far more significant in light
of the dramatic transformation in the size, character, and influence
of cable over the past decade. Now, a cable operator supplies the
local viewing public with a vast array of services, ranging from
access to diverse community groups and ideas to the latest rage in
music videos. Whereas cable operators of the past may have
offered little more than a powerful antenna service capable of
distributing a handful of over-the-air television stations, the
modem cable operator is an originator of news and public affairs,
a source for commercial advertising and political announcements,
the guardian of an increasingly important communications access
system, and the principal (if not exclusive) video editor who must
select among the more than one hundred satellite' and other
program services available for inclusion on a system that,
typically, has a capacity of only thirty to forty channels.'
1. See 61 TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK (Services Volume) G-65 to G-80
(1993) (identifying at least 149 pay TV and satellite services available to cable systems).
2. These changes have taken place on two basic levels. First, until recently, most
cable systems offered only a relatively limited menu of services-consisting mainly of
local TV stations, a few "distant" over-the-air stations, and a simple time and weathertype feature. Indeed, the typical system may have had only a 12-channel capacity.
Today, however, 30, 40, or more channels is the standard, filled with a diversity of
choices unimaginable only a few years ago. The advent of national satellite program
services and the widespread availability of more sophisticated technical switching
equipment at the local level by the mid-1980s permitted virtually unlimited forms of
program origination and advertising, transforming local cable operators into electronic
editors, which exercise discretion in selecting, arranging, and marketing a wide variety
of news, informational, and entertainment program services. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) recently reported that roughly 90% of all cable
subscribers are served by cable systems offering 30 or more different channels. In re
Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating to the Provision
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Municipal3 ownership and operation of cable systems is not
new. Such ownership, in fact, can be traced almost to the
beginning of the cable television business.' But, until recently,
governmental ownership and control were both relatively limited
and confined to fairly unique circumstances-typically to a small
community where, due to prevailing economic conditions, private
ownership was unable to develop.
The last few years, however, have witnessed a disturbing new
phenomenon. In .,ommunity after community municipal authorities
are either threatening or actually deciding to build and operate
their own cable systems either in competition with or to supplant
an existing private operator.' This is accomplished in one of two

of Cable TV Serv., Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 4962, para. 3 (1990); see also 61 TELEVISION
& CABLE FACTBOOK (Cable Systems Volume) F-3 (1993) (reporting that as of November 1, 1992, nearly 60% of all cable subscribers were served by systems with 30 to 53
channels, while nearly 35% were served by systems with 54 or more channels).
3. "Municipal" is a shorthand term used throughout this Article to denote any local
governmental body, including cities, townships, boroughs, counties, and any other similar
political units.
4. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Roy Furchott, Crackdown, CABLEVISION, July 1, 1991, at 20, 20
("Franchise authorities, even in bucolic burgs, have developed new sophistication" in
approaching the franchise renewal process.); see also Bob Boyle, More Cities Want Into
Cable Business, MULTICHANNEL NEwS, Nov. 18, 1991, at 84; Kathy Clayton, FightOver
FiberBuildContinues in Missouri,CABLE WORLD, Oct. 21, 1991, at 20,20 (Springfield,
Mo., "city council voted to hire a consultant to examine the pros and cons of outside
competition vs. a municipally owned cable system designed to compete with the existing
cable operator.'); Dozens ofCitiesAcross Nation Eye BuildingMunicipal CableSystems,
WARREN'S CABLE REG. MONITOR, Feb. 1, 1993, at 1; Georgia City ConsidersMunicipal
Overbuild in Effort to Boost Infrastructure,WARREN'S CABLE REG. MONITOR, Feb. 15,
1993, at 5 (City of La Grange, a suburb of Atlanta, evaluating whether to buyout or
overbuild incumbent private operator in order to realize single wire into the home
providing multiple services such as video, telephony, and interactivity with subscribers);
LocalActivities, WARREN'S CABLE REG. MONITOR, Mar. 8, 1993, at 11, 11 (community
of Seaford, Del., initiates study to determine feasibility of municipal system, with city
mayor quoted as follows: "We get all these complaints but we have no control.");
Municipal Systems: On a Growth Curve-Frustrationwith OperatorsPrompts Cities to
Make Their Own Moves, CABLE WORLD, Nov. 18, 1991, at 44; K.C. Neel & Bob
Diddlebock, Rate ComplaintsPromptFloridaCities to Mull Overbuilds, CABLE WORLD,
May 3, 1993, at 1, 1 ("Officials in two of Florida's fastest-growing cities-St. Petersburg
and Naples-aren't content to let reregulation roll back cable rates: Both cities, citing
subscriber complaints over the cost of cable service, are considering building their own
systems."); Richard Tedesco, San Antonio Seriously Studies Utility Overbuild of
Paragon, CABLEVISION, Sept. 25, 1989, at 11; Rachel W. Thompson, Cities Get More
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ways. First, a municipal authority can revoke or deny renewal of
the franchise held by an incumbent private operator and replace
that operator with its own system. Second, it can permit an
existing private operator to remain in business but award itself a
competitive franchise that allows the governmental unit to
effectively "overbuild" the private operator.
Although many of these activities have been the subject of
court challenges by incumbent operators--on First Amendment,
antitrust, and other grounds-to date, such challenges have been
uniformly unsuccessful.6 The major reason is the current imprimatur of municipal ownership found in federal statutory law. Thus,
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 19847 (1984 Cable Act
or 1984 Act) provides in Section 613(e)(1) that "a State or [local]
franchising authority may hold any ownership interest in any cable
system."' The only restriction is that "editorial control" must be
"exercised through an entity separate from the franchising
authority."9 Surprisingly, this provision was not altered in the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
19920 (1992 Cable Act or 1992 Act), even as Congress bestowed new powers on local franchising authorities in other
significant respects. 1
Assertive on FranchiseRenewals, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 13, 1992, at 3.
6. Within the past two years alone, three of the leading cases have moved through
the local and appellate courts only to be denied certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court. See infra notes 30, 36, 42 and accompanying text.
7. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 533(e)(1) (1988).
9. 47 U.S.C. § 533(e)(2) (1988). The franchising authority may, however, exercise
editorial control over any channel specifically designated for educational or governmental
use.
10. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.A. §§ 521-611 (West Supp. 1993)).
11. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. In one of the first constitutional
challenges to the 1992 Act, several leading cable companies charged, inter alia, that
certain new provisions relating to municipalities discriminated in favor of government
speech against private speech. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, No. 92-2292,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12806, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 1993). The challenged
provisions included a new section permitting municipalities to operate their own systems
without a franchise, 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(f)(2) (West Supp. 1993), and another section
granting municipalities immunity from civil damages in regulating privately-owned
systems, 47 U.S.C.A. § 635A(a) (West Supp. 1993). The district court found, however,
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With such a sweeping statutory license, it is little wonder
that, when confounded by various problems in dealing with private
cable interests, local franchising authorities have increasingly
turned to government ownership to secure a type of cable service
more to their liking. And, as noted, the 1992 Act does nothing to
arrest this trend. Indeed, in its rush to restrict perceived abuses in
the cable industry and to spur the development of competitive
multichannel providers,12 Congress not only overlooked the
problems of municipal ownership, it indirectly enhanced the ability
of local authorities to reject private media ownership in favor of
government ownership.
The issue of municipal ownership, therefore, if left unaddressed, may literally change the face of cable television in many
communities. Instead of the evils some public officials have long
attributed to monopoly private ownership, the pernicious and
practical consequences of permitting unrestricted government
ownership may prove far more profound and damaging to the
public interest-especially if cable television becomes a primary
vehicle on the promised new electronic superhighway reaching
into every home. Congress, the courts, and, perhaps most importantly, the state legislatures must examine and limit this disturbing
trend. At the local level, where cable television is still regarded by
many government officials as more of a public utility than as a
communications medium,13 there is little likelihood of a franchis-

that "[l]egislation authorizing the creation of municipal cable franchises to compete with
private operators does not, by itself, violate the First Amendment or raise a free speech
issue." Daniels Cablevision, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12806, at *1 n.1 (citing Warner
Cable Comm., Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 635-40 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991)).
12. According to House Report 628, the "legislation will protect consumers by
preventing unreasonable rates, by improving the cable industry's customer service
practices, and by sparking the development of a competitive marketplace." H.R. REP.
No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1992); see also S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1133 ("The purpose of this legislation
is to promote competition in the multichannel video marketplace and to provide
protection for consumers against monopoly rates and poor customer service.').
13. See Bob Boyle, Life at a Muni-Owned Cable System, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
May 4, 1992, at 26, 27 (quoting the manager of the city-owned system in Valparaiso,
Florida, as saying: "The residents look at this as a utility.').
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ing authority pausing to debate these public policy and First
Amendment issues before granting itself a franchise.
As successive sections of this Article will demonstrate, the
trend toward municipal ownership of cable television has assumed
decidedly new and different dimensions over the past few years.
Despite a vastly changed cable television business, in many
communities private ownership is being replaced or threatened by
government ownership without any meaningful examination of the
broad public interest implications underlying this transformation.
The prodigious changes in the cable television business,
however, demand that the phenomenon of municipal ownership
not proceed without a full airing of the important public issues
involved. That examination must necessarily start with Section 533(e) of the 1984 Act, which, at present, sanctions municipal
ownership without substantial restriction. While Congress was, in
1984, cognizant of some of the public issues surrounding municipal ownership of cable, it was crafting legislation on a totally
different cable landscape. As a communications business, in cities
small and large, cable television has grown enormously in size,
role, and prominence in the years since Section 533(e) was
enacted. Unfortunately, in passing the 1992 Act, Congress was
largely focused on reregulating certain consumer aspects of cable
and spurring competitive ownership of multiple-channel video
services, apparently even if such competition takes the form of
government ownership.
Today, before municipal ownership spreads to more and
larger communities, several important public policy issues must be
raised and resolved. First, what, if any, public policy advantages
attach to municipal ownership of cable systems when private
ownership is demonstrably available? Second, even if certain
advantages exist, should public monies and resources be directed
to owning and operating cable television when other, more
essential, community-wide services may be in need of greater
attention, again especially in circumstances where a private
operator is already in place or otherwise available to provide
service? Third, in light of the pervasive communications role now
played by cable in so many local communities, how does
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government ownership of this vital medium square with basic First
Amendment values that underlie all federal communications
policy?
Although all of these issues are important, this Article will
deal almost exclusively with the third issue raised-the impact of
municipal ownership on core First Amendment values. It will first
explore the changing complexion of municipal ownership,
highlighting a few prominent recent cases where municipalities
have, after many years of private service, elected to build their
own competitive cable systems. Second, this Article will examine
the statutory framework that presently permits municipal cable
ownership in virtually any circumstance, focusing on the factual
and policy backdrop that led to enactment of 47 U.S.C. § 533(e).
Third, this Article will discuss some of the changes in the cable
television business that necessarily heighten the potential First
Amendment difficulties when local governments step into the role
of communications provider. The increasingly diverse "editorial"
functions now routinely performed by cable operators have greatly
altered the nature of cable service. Even if well intended, public
ownership in such circumstances can inevitably lead to abuses that
not only drive out private competition, but far more importantly,
undermine basic First Amendment principles and interests.
Finally, the Article will conclude that the problems created by
municipal ownership are too persistent and complicated to be
resolved by simply requiring, as in Section 533(e)(2), that the
"editorial" function be entrusted to a local entity somehow
separated from local franchising authorities. Rather, Section 533(e)
should be replaced by a new provision that permits municipal
cable ownership only as a "last resort." Instead of affirmatively
sanctioning municipal ownership, federal communications law
should encourage private ownership and permit public ownership
only in circumstances where, following a public proceeding, it has
been determined that no private provider exists that is willing and
able to provide cable service to the community in question.
Moreover, in the absence of changes in federal law, state legislative bodies should formulate and announce their own public policy
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restricting municipalities from becoming a primary provider of
mass media services.
I. THE CHANGING COMPLEXION OF MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP
Cable television is no longer merely a "community antenna"
service. Direct government ownership and control of cable would
cause little alarm if the cable television industry had not changed
so drastically since its inception. The new nature of cable
television, however, casts into much sharper relief the changes
taking place in municipal ownership and control of the medium.
A.

General Developments in the Cable Industry
Cable television today is vastly different and a far more
important community medium than it was only a decade ago. It
has, in a relatively short period of time, developed into an
elaborate communications service that, in most communities, is the
primary way the majority of the public receives its news, information, entertainment, and other television services.14
Although estimates vary, the first commercial community
antenna (CATV) systems started providing service in the late
1940s or very early 1950s."5 As recently summarized by the
FCC: "Cable systems began in areas with poor off-air television
reception, and at first primarily offered improved reception of
existing broadcast signals or imported a few distant signals."16
The rapid development of satellite program delivery services
changed matters dramatically. With a wide variety of news,
information, and cultural and entertainment services suddenly
available in even the smallest comer of America, the availability

14. Cable television's nationwide reach rose to a record high of 65% in July 1993,
according to data recently released by Arbitron. CablePenetrationReached 65%, COMM.
DAILY, Sept. 20, 1993, at 6.
15. See REGULATION OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA SYSTEMS, H.R. REP. No. 1635,89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966); see also S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983).
16. FLORENCE SETZER & JONATHON LEVY, BROADCAST TELEVISION IN A
MULTICHANNEL MARKETPLACE 6 (FCC Office of Plans & Policy Working Paper No.

26, 1991).
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of and demand for cable television increased substantially, even in
areas with good over-the-air reception.
In responding to these changes, cable television has been
transformed from a mere retransmission service into an important
communications medium.17 Cable operators, whether privatelyowned or municipally operated, must create and then constantly
refine the programming lineup they offer subscribers. For example,
cable operators must choose from among a vast array of programming services devoted to such subjects as news and political
developments (C-SPAN I and II, Cable News Network, Consumer
News and Business Channel), law (Courtroom Television Network), religion (National Jewish Television, VISN), music (MTV,
VH-1, The Nashville Network), minority interests (Black Entertainment Television, Galavision), education (The Discovery
Channel, Mind Extension University), sports (ESPN, SportsChannel), Hollywood feature films (Home Box Office, Showtime,
American Movie Classics, Encore, The Movie Channel), and
general entertainment programming (USA Network, WTBS, TNT).
They must also decide whether to include special programming for
children and adults (including potentially ribald material) and
whether to cover local events and meetings (city council, 16cal
school boards, etc.).
In recognition of this changing role, the Supreme Court has
stated that cable operators exercise "a significant amount of
editorial discretion regarding what their programming will
include."' 8 Similarly, it has stated that "through original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or
programs to include in its repertoire, [a cable operator] seeks to

17. As summarized by the Senate Report leading to the 1992 Act:
Most of America is now wired to receive cable; cable service is available to
almost 90 percent of the homes in the country, and over 60 percent of these
households subscribe to cable service. System capacity has increased; the
average cable system offers about 36 channels, and this number is steadily
increasing. Programming choices have also grown about 50 percent since the
1984 Act was passed, with many more offerings now being planned. Cable
television has become our Nation's dominant video distribution medium.
S. REP. No. 92, supra note 12, at 3, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1143-44 (emphasis added).
18. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979).
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communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide
variety of formats."19 As the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has noted, it is now "clearly established" that in
selecting or creating programs and program sources to offer to
their subscribers, "cable operators engage in conduct protected by
the First Amendment." 20
B.

Background and Recent Developments Relating to Municipal
Ownership of Cable Television
Municipal ownership of cable television is nearly as old as
cable television itself. According to one report, several municipal
systems were in operation as early as 1950.21 These pioneer
systems "were installed primarily because of community isolation
and were a direct requirement for local T.V. reception. "22 In fact,
the "primary motivation for public ownership" by such communities was usually an inability to "attract the interest of private
companies. 23
The survey, conducted by the National Civic Review,
reported that twenty-eight municipally-owned systems were in
operation in 1981, most of which were in relatively small, remote
communities.24 Thus, seventeen of the twenty-eight communities
reported as having some form of municipal ownership had fewer
than 2500 residents and twelve (or more than 40 percent) had
fewer than one thousand residents.2 Ten years later, in March
1991, it was reported that sixty-two city-owned cable systems

19. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm., Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).
20. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986) (citations omitted).
21. See David W. MacKenna, The Cabling of America: What About Municipal
Ownership?, 70 NAT'L CIVIc REv. 307, 310 (1981).
22. Id. at 312.
23. Id. Other sources confirm the highly restricted development of municipal cable
ownership. An article in the University of San FranciscoLaw Review in 1978 identified
19 communities owning and operating their own systems at that time. Richard M.
Synchef, MunicipalOwnership of Cable Television Systems, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 205, 205
n.1, 235 n.158 (1978).
24. MacKenna, supra note 21, at 311.
25. Id.
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were already
in fall operation (including a number of
"overbuilds"26 ) and that eighty-six additional communities in
twenty states were at various stages of considering outright
overbuilds to compete with the service of an existing private
provider.27
More than numbers, however, were changing. As the same
cable publication pointedly observed: "Since deregulation [under
the 1984 Act] terminated the ability of cities to lord over cable
with the threat of rate control, they've resorted to more drastic
threats: shorter franchises, multiple franchises and municipal
overbuilds."2 In other words, having been stripped of their pre1984 Act leverage, local government officials, in increasing
numbers, turned to municipal ownership and control as a means
of bringing about changes in the level and nature of cable service
in their communities.
Whether the restoration of rate regulation in the 1992 Act
will diminish or change these developments in any significant
respect remains an open question. Nevertheless, the expanded role
of cable television and the increasing sophistication of cities in
dealing with the medium have changed the dynamics substantially.
No longer content to base decisions regarding municipal ownership on need (as in the early years), local franchising authorities
are now far more willing to wade into these waters with every
intent of replacing incumbent private providers.
Three of the most prominent forays into municipal ownership
have resulted in recent court decisions-all of which have
affirmed the aggressive tactics of local franchising authorities.
Together, these cases aptly illustrate the rapidly changing
complexion of municipal cable ownership.

26. The term "overbuild" refers to a situation in which a new or second cable
system is authorized and constructed (whether private or public) "over" the same lines
and/or area served by an incumbent cable operator.
27. Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Cable TVFranchising,Mar. 25, 1991, at 1 (News
Roundup); see also Stacey Hobart, Municipally Owned Cable Systems, PUB. POWER,
Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 156 (reporting 63 municipally-controlled systems in operation).
28. Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Cable TV Franchising,Mar. 25, 1991, at 4.
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1.

Paragould, Arkansas
Paragould, Arkansas, is a community of approximately fifteen
thousand, situated in the northeast comer of the state. It has no
local television station and receives over-the-air television service
from only one station, located in Jonesboro, approximately
twenty miles away. Paragould has had cable television service
since September 1965.29 In 1986, the City placed an ordinance
before Paragould voters authorizing construction of a city-owned
system. On June 17, 1986, the voters, by a three-to-one margin,
approved the ordinance and the City ultimately awarded a
"competitive" franchise to its own Paragould City Light and Water
Commission (CLW).3 °
In launching its rival system, Paragould raised $3.22 million
through a public bond issue.3" The City began operations in
March 1991 and, within six months, had acquired more than two
thousand subscribers. 32 Its success was perhaps ensured by
threats, spread through an aggressive marketing campaign, to raise
property taxes to finance the system unless the City received at
least 60 percent of the Paragould cable market.
In challenging the City's actions in federal court, the
incumbent operator charged that the City had violated the antitrust
laws and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and had breached
its franchise agreement. The operator claimed that by granting a
franchise to the CLW, Paragould had facilitated "monopoly
leveraging" or the use of monopoly power in one market to
restrain competition in a second market. But the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the State of Arkansas
had clearly authorized municipalities to enter the cable business
29. 59 TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK (Cable & Services Volume) A-103 (1991).
30. Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 430 (1991).
31. Id.
32. By early 1993 it was reported that the government-run Paragould system had
increased its subscriber count to 3579 while offering 48 basic channels for $12.50 per
month. The private system, which remains in operation, was reported to have dropped
to 4660 subscribers, and to be offering 45 channels for $10.50. Vincente Pasdeloup,
Double Hit in Paragould,CABLE WORLD, Apr. 19, 1993, at 6, 6.
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and, as such, that the City was entitled to utilize its unique access
to the existing governmental infrastructure, such as utility poles,
rights of way, city employees, city vehicles, and office space.33
The operator also argued that its First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated because its franchise contained
a provision requiring the operator to notify and gain approval from
the City before soliciting advertising on its system, whereas the
franchise between the City and CLW contained no such restriction.
The operator claimed that this differing treatment infringed both
its First Amendment speech rights and its Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection rights.3" But the court held that by entering into
its earlier franchise agreement, the cable operator "effectively
bargained away some of its free speech rights" and "cannot now
invoke the First Amendment to recapture surrendered rights."3
2.

Niceville, Florida

Niceville, Florida, is a community of approximately 8500
located near the Gulf Coast in Florida's Panhandle. It has no local
television station and receives its only over-the-air service from
stations in the Pensacola/Mobile and Panama City television
markets, each located more than thirty miles away.
The incumbent operator had been providing cable service for
fourteen years when the Niceville City Council, in 1985, passed
an ordinance authorizing the City's own system. This followed
"numerous consumer complaints" regarding the private provider's
service and a report favoring municipal ownership by a consulting
firm hired by the City.3 6 Among the motives attributed to city
officials for launching a rival system were objections to the
incumbent operator's editorial judgment and disagreements with
the operator's policies as to certain religious programming.37

33. ParagouldCablevision, 930 F.2d at 1313-14.
34. Id. at 1314.
35. Id. at 1315.
36. Warner Cable Comm., Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 635 (1lth Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2839 (1991).
37. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit at 2, 5, Warner Cable Comm., Inc. v. City of Niceville, 111 S.Ct.
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The incumbent operator filed suit, alleging that the City's
conduct violated its constitutional rights of freedom of speech and
due process. It sought damages, a declaration that the City's
ordinance was unconstitutional, and injunctive relief against
enforcement of the ordinance.38 Ultimately, however, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found for the City. As
to the incumbent's constitutional claim, the court found (a) that
potential economic injury did not rise to the level of a First
Amendment injury and (b) that the private operator was not
impeded in its continued ability to speak to Niceville cable
viewers despite the presence of a competitive system operated by
its local regulator.3
3.

Morganton, North Carolina
Morganton, North Carolina, is a community of nearly
fourteen thousand nestled in the foothills of the Pisgah National
Forest. Without its own local television outlet, Morganton has
been served by a private cable provider for more than twenty
years. However, with its franchise set to expire in 1986, the
private provider requested a five-year extension from the city
council in 1983. The City refused and issued a "Request For
Proposals" (RFP) in September 1984. In response to this RFP, the
incumbent operator and two other privately-owned cable companies submitted franchise applications. Following a public hearing,
the City of Morganton decided to (a) establish its own system,
(b) deny the incumbent's request for renewal, (c) deny franchise
applications submitted by the other two private companies, and
(d) effectively prohibit (for a period of five years) the provision

2839 (1991) (No. 90-1463). In particular, the record reflects that some local officials in
Niceville objected to the incumbent operator's decision to drop Praise the Lord's
Inspirational Network, a satellite-distributed cable television service featuring Jim and
Tammy Bakker.
38. Warner Cable Comm., Inc. v. City of Niceville, No. 85-4414-RV (N.D. Fla.
Mar. 10, 1989).
39. Warner Cable, 911 F.2d at 638.
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of cable television service in Morganton by anyone in competition
with the City's system.40
In a familiar pattern, the City's decision was preceded by
years of wrangling between the cable operator and the City
Council over certain programming and operational judgments
exercised by the system. For example, in 1979 the Council had
conditioned its approval of a rate increase on the addition of a
specific channel to the system's program lineup. In 1980, the City
Council claimed that the system's introduction of HBO, its first
satellite pay service, was a violation of the franchise. The Council
also passed a resolution urging customers not to subscribe to the
service until the Council could review it. Later, city officials
demanded that the system rearrange its service offerings to add
ESPN without any change in rates. 4
Faced with a city decision that would put it out of business,
the Morganton operator sued the City, alleging a violation of its
First Amendment rights. In particular, the incumbent operator
argued that it had the right to use the city-owned poles and rightsof-way indefinitely, notwithstanding the lack of a franchise. The
district court, however, concluded that the City's refusal to renew
was fully justified by the City's control over its public rights-ofway; did not violate the incumbent operator's First Amendment
rights; and, in fact, furthered such substantial governmental
interests as enforcing contracts, imposing public service obligations, and preventing public disruption.4'

40. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6-7, Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of
Morganton, No. 90-1500, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27676 (4th Cir. Nov. 22, 1991)
[hereinafter Plaintiff's Briefl. The City had engaged the services of an outside consulting
firm that, following certain studies, concluded that existing cable service in Morganton
was inadequate, that a more modem system was needed, and that a city-owned system
was feasible. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, No. 90-1500, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27676, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 22, 1991).
41. Madison Cablevision, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27676, at *21-*22.
42. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, No. SH-C-86-5, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18794, at *16-*20 (W.D.N.C. May 11, 1990), affidper curiam, No. 901500, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27676 (4th Cir. Nov. 22, 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1670 (1992); see also Edward Hardy Lewis, Municipal Ownership of Cable Television
Systems: Madison Cablevision,Inc. v. City of Morganton, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1295 (1990).
By the summer of 1993, Morganton's transformation from private to exclusive
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Municipal ownership, therefore, is no longer a rural novelty.
It is a unique social experiment being conducted in more and
different circumstances, placing in plain relief the problems and
public policy issues that such ownership necessarily entails.
C.

Factors Weighing Against Municipal Ownership in
Circumstances Where Private Ownership Is Available
In contrast to most municipal ownership situations in the past,
which were confined mainly to isolated geographic areas, the more
recent trend has been toward broader governmental ownership,
often unleashed as a direct reaction to complaints or other
confrontations with the incumbent private provider. It is one thing
for a local government to establish its own system when economic
or other factors have effectively precluded private ownership. It is
quite another to launch such ownership either to replace longstanding service or in order to ensure a government-run alternative
positioned to eventually supplant the private provider.
If private ownership has not developed in a given community
in the face of a demonstrable need, it is difficult to challenge a
local government's attempt, as a last alternative, to establish some
form of governmental ownership. On the other hand, if private
ownership already exists or would be readily available to provide
new or continuous cable service, serious questions are raised by
permitting a local franchising authority to (a) shut down the
private provider and launch a replacement system of its own,
(b) grant itself a competitive franchise and "overbuild" an existing
private provider, or (c) simply launch new or replacement cable
service without even considering private ownership.
Given the programming diversity, technological maturity, and
operational sophistication of contemporary cable systems, the
question arises as to what overriding benefits derive from
governmental ownership in situations where the availability of
governmental cable ownership was virtually complete. The incumbent operator's
franchise expired on June 30, 1993, and it was reported that the City's replacement
system had passed nearly 6500 homes and was serving approximately 5300 subscribers.
See Chris Nolan, The City That Works, CABLEVISION, Aug. 9, 1993, at 32; Carl
Wenschenk, Another Chapter in Morganton, CABLE WORLD, June 28, 1993, at 32.
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private ownership is not in doubt. Clearly, there is no prevailing
evidence that a government agency makes a better or more
consumer-responsive cable operator. In fact, a community
launching its own cable service always does so without any
experience in the cable television business-usually proceeding on
the unfounded proposition that operating a local cable system is
not much different from operating a local water or electric-power
system.
If local government franchising authorities become unusually
vexed over rates, services, and other conditions of cable operation,
they do not have to start their own businesses to bring about
change. Even prior to the 1992 Act, which empowers municipal
authorities in several critical respects, it was clear that the power
of franchise renewal stood as a very effective tool in the hands of
local regulators. There is little doubt that most private operators
would respond favorably to pressure, when properly applied by the
franchising authority, to bring about legitimate improvements.43
Now, however, the 1992 Act gives local governments renewed
power to regulate cable rates,' makes explicit their ability to
impose customer service standards that exceed those adopted by
the FCC or cover matters not dealt with by the FCC,45 and
clarifies their authority to extract more specific commitments in
43. Despite the general perception of lost power under the 1984 Act and complaints
to that effect, cities were still able to wield considerable power, especially in the renewal
process:
Cities are learning increasingly how to use that power to exact concessions
from cable systems that potentially amount to re-regulation. "They get leverage
by threatening an overbuild, a municipal overbuild, a short review, franchise
fees

...

,"

says John Mansel, a senior analyst with Paul Kagan Associates.

Threats of denied renewal and municipal overbuilds ... once weighed
about as heavily as a 12 ounce hammer in the hands of franchise authorities.
Now that hammer has become a 10-pound sledge.
Furchott, supra note 5, at 21.
44. Section 3 of the 1992 Act amends § 623 of the 1934 Communications Act. As
amended, § 623 provides, inter alia, that, in the event a cable system is "not subject to
effective competition" (currently the vast majority of cable systems as that term is
defined by statute and FCC rules), then its "rates for the provision of basic cable service
shall be subject to regulation by a franchising authority." 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 1993).
45. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 552(c)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
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the area of technical performance standards.4 6 Considering such
expanded powers, the public policy rationale permitting municipal
ownership under most circumstances is even more suspect.
When a municipality elects to be both regulator and communications service provider, questions arise concerning the allocation of community resources. For example, in Paragould the City
elected to issue municipal bonds and threatened to raise local
property taxes to achieve its purpose of "overbuilding" the existing
private provider. In so doing, the City's priorities and projects in
other areas of municipal government were obviously affected.47
Especially in the 1990s, when all levels of government are
strapped in their ability to provide vital services, it is questionable
how essential it is for a municipality to expend any resources to
develop a competitive or replacement city-owned and controlled
cable communications service.4
Finally, it must be said that cable television, despite its
heightened prominence in the lives of so many, is still not an
essential community service on par with light, water, and power
for which universal service is generally regarded as a social
necessity.49 While dependent on the use of certain public facili-

ties to reach all subscribers along its path, the provision of cable
service is a decidedly different activity, one whose primary

46. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 544(e) (West Supp. 1993).
47. It was recently reported that the citizens of Paragould will now have to face a
special tax to pay off the $3.2 million in bonds issued to fund the overbuild in that
community. See Pasdeloup, supra note 32, at 6.
48. To those who might be tempted to argue that cities should enter the cable
business in order to create a new general revenue source-over and above the up-to-5%
franchise fee they are presently permitted to extract as a matter of course-it must be
noted that (a) such revenues have yet to be proven (especially from the stand-alone,
restricted-operation systems typically conducted by municipal governments) and (b) even
if such revenues are sufficient to warrant and overcome the initial cost of construction
or acquisition, cost is merely one of many factors that should be weighed in reaching a
practical (as opposed to a pure policy) judgment as to whether cities should operate
cable systems in the face of existing private service.
49. The 1984 Act purposely declares that the provision of cable services does not
constitute a "common carrier" activity. 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1988). The Senate Report
also notes that "cable is neither a monopoly service nor is it an essential service, which
are the two traditional tests of common carrier or utility status." S. REP. No. 67, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1983).
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purpose is not in supplying a vital energy source, but in bringing
local residents an important complement to their daily lives. In
performing this type of function-that is, supplying news, entertainment, and general enrichment, instead of electrical energy-the
operation of a contemporary cable system necessarily invites First
Amendment considerations.
If.

THE CABLE ACT AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

The 1984 Act laid to rest any previous doubt whether municipalities and other local governmental entities could own and
operate their own cable television systems. Thus, Section 533(e)
provides as follows:
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a State or franchising authority
may hold any ownership interest in any cable system.
(2) Any State or franchising authority shall not exercise any
editorial control regarding the content of any cable service on a
cable system in which such governmental entity holds ownership
interest (other than programming on any channel designated for
educational or governmental use), unless such control is exercised
through an entity separate from the franchising authority."

It is uncertain, however, whether Congress intended (or even
imagined) that local government officials would become the
aggressive provider of first choice. Indeed, although Congress
considered certain proposals that would have restricted city-owned
50. 47 U.S.C. § 533(e) (1988). Apart from this federal enabling law, ownership of
cable systems by local municipalities must also be tested against various provisions of
state law that govern the permissible activities of local governments. See, e.g., Warner
Cable Comm., Inc. v. Borough of Schuyllill Haven, 784 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
For most city-owned systems the right to own a cable system is derived, if at all, by
implication from broadly worded statutes that grant a municipality the right to own and
operate its own "public utilities." Indeed, one court recently held that a "public utility"
clause in the South Carolina Constitution did not authorize the City of Orangeburg to
construct and operate its own cable system. See South Carolina Disallows Municipal

Ownership, CABLE TV LAW REP., June 9, 1992, at 2 (summarizing Sheppard v. City of
Orangeburg, 91 CP 38715 (C.P. Orangeburg County, S.C. May 27, 1992)). In contrast,
of course, federal communications law now treats cable television as a medium of mass
communications and not a public utility-type service. See Communications Amendments
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 115(c)(2), 96 Stat. 1087, 1094-95 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(C)(i) (1988)) (defining "media of mass communications" as including
services such as television, radio, and "cable television" that are "substantially devoted
toward providing programming or other information services within the editorial control
of the licensee").
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systems, it eventually opted for municipal ownership under a
scheme whereby First Amendment interests would supposedly be
preserved by requiring that any editorial role be performed by a
"separate entity" (i.e., a governmental unit separate from the
specific franchising authority)."
The broad context in which Congress addressed municipal
ownership in the 1984 Act is summarized in the House Committee
Report as follows:
Cable ownership issues arise in three contexts: municipal
ownership of a system; a city's acquisition of a system from a
commercial operator in the event of a breach of the franchise or
upon expiration of the franchise; and efforts to diversify the
ownership of cable systems.
Most cable systems are owned and operated by commercial
cable interests. Municipal ownership and ownership by non-profit
entities like cooperatives have traditionally evolved in communities
where private companies were not particularly interested in offering
cable services because of expected low return on investment.
More recently, however, a number of larger cities have taken
a close look at building their own cable systems as a profitable
means of making cable more responsive to city residents' needs.
While proponents applaud municipal ownership as a way to meet
local needs, critics raise First Amendment concerns about government control of a part of the media. These concerns are addressed
in the legislation. 2

The method chosen by Congress to achieve the dual purpose
of fostering cable competition while preserving First Amendment
values was to permit city ownership, but only if a city's ability to
exercise editorial control over the content of programming was
somehow restricted. As explained in House Report 934, the intent
was to:
bar[] the state or franchising authority from exercising any editorial
control over the content of any cable service provided over that
cable system (other than programming on any channel designated
for educational or governmental use), unless the editorial control is
exercised through an entity separate from the franchising authority.
The Committee has included this requirement in order to preclude

51. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(e)(2) (1988).
52. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4664.
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undue government
control of programming contrary to the First
53
Amendment.

While this legislative history reflects a strong concern for
protecting important First Amendment interests, no specificity is
provided beyond the "separate entity" provision itself. Moreover,
even though Congress obviously put substantial stock in the
necessity of this "separate entity" requirement, little is said about
how it was intended to work. Only the slightest hint is provided
in this summation from Senate Report 67:
The committee [Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation] believes that Government control of the content of
the programming on a Government-owned cable system is patently
inconsistent with First Amendment principles. No government,
Federal, State, or local, should have the power or the ability to
control news and information disseminated over any electronic
medium.
Therefore, the State, and so forth, would have to establish an
independent board or separate management company, and such
board or company shall not include any State or local office holder.
The Committee believes that government officials should not
participate in decisionmaking on matters affecting program
content. 4

In sum, Congress gave municipal ownership a major boost in
the 1984 Act. While acknowledging the potential First Amendment
problems that might lie down this road, Congress merely paused
long enough to add the rather ill-defined separate editorial entity
concept in 47 U.S.C. § 533(e)(2). While regrettable, it is nevertheless understandable that, in the early 1980s, Congress saw little
need to ponder this issue at great length. On the other hand, when
the 1992 Act was being debated a decade later, cable had already
developed as a full-fledged mass media provider to the majority
of American homes. Given this dramatic turnabout in cable's role
and level of influence, Congress either ignored or missed a vital
opportunity to reflect anew on the dangers of sanctioning direct
government ownership and control of local media.
Instead of addressing the issue of municipal ownership
directly, as in the 1984 Act, it appears that in the 1992 Act the
53. Id. at 58, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4695.
54. S.REP. No. 67, supra note 15, at 21 (emphasis added).
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point was lost in larger issues. Indeed, Congress not only reaffirmed municipal ownership in the 1992 Act, it substantially
exacerbated the problem by vesting local authorities with added
regulatory powers. First, in rushing to rein in cable for perceived
abuses in rates and services, while at the same time focusing on
methods to encourage competitive alternatives to local cable
service, Congress seems to have simply brushed aside any
consideration of the serious First Amendment and public policy
issues posed by municipal ownership. Second, the 1992 Act
actually facilitates expanded municipal ownership. Thus, Section
541(f) of the 1992 Act enables municipal franchise authorities to
operate cable systems free of the extensive franchising requirements (including the payment of franchise fees) that they are
empowered to impose on private cable operators.5 ' The 1992 Act
56
also exempts franchise authorities from damage liability.
In addition, as noted, the 1992 Act also gives local franchising authorities new power to regulate the rates and services of
private cable operators. 7 While these new regulatory powers
over private systems may ultimately result in curtailing any future
escalation of municipal ownership, the potential for governmental
abuse remains. It is possible, of course, that cities will simply
continue the trend toward favoring their own systems over private
systems, increasingly comfortable in the view that they now have
even greater power and means ultimately to supplant private
providers. Moreover, even if they have no real intention of going
into the media business, cities may nevertheless use their new
power and leverage to threaten to build a competitive system in

55. 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(f) (West Supp. 1993). This section now provides that nothing
in the Act shall (1) prohibit a local or municipal authority from operating as a
multichannel video programmer in the franchise area, notwithstanding the granting of
one or more franchises to others, or (2) require such local or municipal authority to
secure a franchise to operate as a multichannel video programming distributor.
56. 47 U.S.C.A. § 555a(a) (West Supp. 1993). This section now provides that a
franchising authority is exempt from damages in any suit involving any claim arising out
of its regulation of cable service or from a decision of approval or disapproval with
respect to the grant, renewal, transfer, or amendment of a franchise. Relief in such cases
is specially limited to injunctive and declaratory relief.
57. 47 U.S.C.A. § 543(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993).
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order to extract major commitments from private providers that
they would otherwise be unable to achieve.
I.

CABLE'S DEVELOPING ROLE AS A PRIMARY
COMMUNICATIONS MEDIUM

UNDERSCORES FIRST AMENDMENT TENSIONS IN PERMITTING
DIRECT GOVERNMENTAL OWNERSHIP

As local franchising authorities look to ownership and control
of their own cable systems, they do so against the backdrop of a
cable and video marketplace vastly different from what existed in
1984, when federal communications law first formally authorized
municipal ownership. These changed circumstances, where cable
has assumed a more prominent mass media role, greatly heighten
the important public policy issues underlying governmental
ownership of this emerging communications service. For instance,
if cable television in many communities is the sole video communications service, is it sound public policy to permit governmental
ownership of that service if private ownership is readily available?
Moreover, should not public and communications policy in this
area seek to ensure government neutrality in the operation of this
increasingly important local communications service?
This section begins by setting the constitutional framework
in which these issues arise. It then proceeds to show how cable
television has developed into a unique local communications
service in which the system operator plays an increasingly active
and ongoing editorial role. Finally, it shows that, as a practical
matter, important First Amendment interests cannot be effectively
preserved by attempting to separate the editorial function from
other aspects of governmental ownership.
The First Amendment, 8 which operates to restrict the ability
of government to censor or control individual speech, does not, in
general, restrict the ability of a municipality to speak.59 Thus,
58. The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
59. See Muir v. Alabama Educ. TV Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983). The government may add its voice to private voices
"provided it does not drown out private communication." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERi-
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there is no outright constitutional prohibition on the ability of a
municipality to operate cable systems.
The question raised here, however, is whether, as an overall
communications policy issue, federal and state statutory law
should permit-even encourage-municipalities to operate their
own cable systems, 60 either exclusively or in competition with a

CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-4, at 807 (2d ed. 1988) (citations omitted).
60. In raising this issue, it is interesting to contrast the recent trend toward municipal
ownership of local cable systems with the potential governmental ownership of local
television stations, the other visual mass medium of communications regulated by the
federal government. It seems fairly likely that any effort to supplant the private
ownership of a major network television station with direct governmental ownership
would generate a large public outcry in most American cities. There is, of course, no
provision of federal communications law governing municipal ownership of commercial
television stations comparable to § 533(e) of the Cable Act. While the FCC has never
addressed this issue in any broad policymaking fashion, it did, in television's infancy,
award certain "commercial" television licenses to state universities. KOMU-TV, Channel
8, the NBC affiliate in Columbia, Missouri, licensed to the University of Missouri, and
WOI-TV, Channel 5, the ABC affiliate in Ames, Iowa, licensed to Iowa State University,
are such vestiges of the past. In addition, of course, federal law sanctions and
affirmatively encourages state ownership of noncommercial, educational television
stations. But the reasons supporting state ownership of educational stations, in fact,
underscore the uniqueness and sensitivity of entrusting the dominant commercial
television medium to governmental ownership. Because of their special educational
mission and noncommercial nature, public television stations have been quite properly
treated as an exception to the general system of American broadcasting. State ownership
was and is often necessary because of the difficulty of making noncommercial stations
self-sustaining and because of the deep involvement of state and local governments in
education. Furthermore, the primarily educational nature of noncommercial service, see
47 C.F.R. § 73.621 (1992), limits the potential influence of noncommercial stations and
reduces the dangers associated with state control. Significantly, on the only recent
occasion when the FCC faced the question of assigning ownership of a major
commercial television station from private to governmental ownership, it decided to
defer action pending a local court suit challenging the acquisition under state law. See
Letter from Alex D. Felker, Chief, MM, FCC, to Cosmos Brdcst. Corp. (June 19, 1989)
(BALCT-881223KH) (on file with the FederalCommunicationsLaw Journal).Although
the application was subsequently withdrawn without further FCC action, the Commission's public policy concern when faced with the possibility of approving a transfer of
ownership of the NBC affiliate in Montgomery, Alabama, from private hands into the
hands of a state agency, is worth noting. It said:
[T]he particular circumstances presented in this case may raise communications policy concerns which we do not believe should be resolved unnecessarily in an adjudicatory context. Specifically, we find problematic the advisability
of licensing television stations to governmental entities where commercial
broadcast facilities are involved and the authorization is sought through
assignment or transfer proceedings in which private competing applicants may
not be considered.
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private provider. A fundamental rationale for the protections
afforded by the First Amendment is a healthy distrust of government. Thus, government as a speaker, selecting and filtering
messages, is a role that rightfully has raised significant First
Amendment concerns. The basis for these concerns is readily
apparent in situations where the government's role as speaker has
the effect of constricting the flow of information or ideas.61
Government in such a situation is not merely adding its voice to
the marketplace of ideas, but is acting to deter or limit other
speakers from entering the marketplace.
The First Amendment requires, and the vitality of our
democratic system depends on, a robust private press, not a
government monopoly speaker.62 John Stuart Mill formulated a
widely accepted public policy principle when he argued that
government should not be entitled to a monopoly over the ideas
or arguments the public hears.6' This marketplace of ideas notion
is built around two tenets of a democratic state: government is not
infallible and government cannot be the only provider of news and
information.
The Supreme Court has held that operation of a cable system
"plainly implicate[s] First Amendment interests." ' Although the

Id. at 3-4.
61. Muir, 688 F.2d at 1038 (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)); see also
Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728, 733 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[E]vils inherent in
allowing government to create a monopoly over dissemination of public information in
any form seem too obvious to require extended discussion.").
62. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ("[T]he press serves and
was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental
officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the
people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve."). A fundamental
premise of the First Amendment is that oppressive government is best avoided through
a watchful press that polices the government, not through a watchful government that
polices the press. A "basic assumption of our political system [is] that the press will
often serve as an important restraint on government." Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
63. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (David Spitz ed., Norton 1975).
64. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm., Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986); see
also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) ("Cable television provides to its
subscribers news, information, and entertainment. It is engaged in 'speech' under the
First Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the 'press."'); id. at 445
(Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he information service provided by cable does not differ
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standard by which these interests are to be judged remains
unclear,6" the Court's determination that the activities engaged in
by cable operators warrant First Amendment protection is
unquestionably correct.
Cable operators supply a wide array of programming, both as
originators of program material and as editors facilitating the
dissemination of program material produced by others. Indeed,
cable system operators, whether private or government-owned,
engage in at least three broad types of speech activities: (1) as
originators of expression; (2) as disseminators of the expression of
others; and (3) as gatekeepers for users of public, educational, and
government access channels.
At the outset, any local government considering ownership of
its own cable system must decide between having the most
technologically sophisticated system capable of providing the most
elaborate subscriber choices or having a more basic system better
suited to the community's resources (dependent, of course, on
public funds). However, even if a basic system is selected,
important editorial choices must be made. As we have seen, given
current channel capacity restrictions and the plethora of available
program services, numerous choices must be made among the
types of news, entertainment, and sports. For instance, does the
operator want a shopping service, a religious channel, a sports
channel, a comedy channel, a news channel, a channel devoted to
minority interests represented in the community, or a channel
devoted to adult or mature entertainment? Moreover, how should
these services be packaged and priced, and should some (and, if
so, which ones) be made available on a premium or pay-channel
basis?
In addition to editorial choices in disseminating messages of
others, even the smallest government-run cable system will face
difficult decisions in originating messages of its own, as well as
significantly from the information services provided by ...newspapers, magazines,
television broadcasters, and radio stations.") (emphasis in original); Quincy Cable TV,
Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
65. The PreferredCourt deferred any further First Amendment findings until a better
factual record had been developed in the lower courts. Preferred,476 U.S. at 495.
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facilitating the speech of others in the community. Whether it is
coverage of important public meetings or providing access to local
politicians, choices have to be made-even if the choices (by
affirmation or non-action) are to limit or prohibit use of the
system for such activities.
Some commentators, at least in the past, have sought to
downplay the editorial role of cable operators, arguing that the
selection of a particular program service, rather than specific
programs, makes a cable operator unlike the newspaper editor who
reviews each word before the material is published.6 6 This
analogy is not altogether valid, however, as different media have
different needs, and the role of editor in one should not define or
limit the role of editor in another. For example, the sheer magnitude of programming offered makes it virtually impossible for a
cable operator to preview in advance each and every program
segment that is scheduled to appear on a given cable network run.
This is not to say, however, that cable operators are unfamiliar
with the general content of the program services that they select
or that such content is unimportant to the inclusion of a particular
program service. Indeed, since many cable services are specifically
designed to meet the viewing interests of highly discrete segments
of the viewing audience, 67 the general thrust of the programming
of a particular service is a prime factor in the initial selection and
placement of that service on the cable system.
It is true that the vast majority of cable systems all carry
certain cable networks, 6 and that these networks are also the
most popular with subscribers. It would be incorrect, however, to
conclude that the selection of these services is not an exercise in

66. See, e.g., Daniel Brenner, Cable Television andthe FreedomofExpression, 1988
DuKE L.J. 329.
67. Current examples of such "niche" services include Comedy Central, the
Nashville Network, the Travel Channel, MTV, QVC Network, the Learning Channel, and
the Weather Channel.
68. Although most of the highly popular cable networks are carried by most cable

systems, seldom do two cable systems select precisely the same services to offer the
public. This, as noted, is due to channel capacity problems, decisions regarding the
relevance of certain services to the particular local community involved, and the need
to select between a number of essentially duplicative program offerings.
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editorial discretion. Just as the decision of a newspaper to include
a sports section in its daily edition is an editorial decision, 69 so
too is the decision of a cable operator to include ESPN or a
regional sports network in its program lineup. The fact that
inclusion of ESPN is also, largely or in part, driven by a desire to
maximize system subscribers does not remove this essential
editorial element.
It is, therefore, not open to serious doubt that cable operators
perform important editorial functions. That cable operators
controlled by local governments can make editorial decisions free
of government influence is a proposition that, on its face, seems
to defy human nature and the inherent workings of the political
process. Is it reasonable to assume, for instance, that a city
(whether directly or through an editorial board selected by city
officials or others) will not make some of its cable programming
decisions based not just on the perceived needs of subscribers, but
with a view toward the possible political fallout precipitated by a
"wrong," unpopular, or highly controversial decision? It would be
an unusual local government official or employee who was not
especially sensitive to public reaction and the political position of
his or her supervisors in government.
Similarly, decisions whether to cover local government
meetings or to showcase community events necessarily become
government decisions in the hands of a municipal cable operator,
not decisions by a neutral unencumbered editor responding only
to subscriber needs and interests. In the same vein, one has to
question the propriety of government officials or their agents, in
control of the sole or dominant local medium of mass communications, making decisions regarding which elements of the public
(individuals, groups, associations, etc.) should have access to
cable, and what regular or special local events should be covered.
Will the local government-controlled cable system also provide

69. For example, the Wall Street Journal,a national newspaper, includes no sports
section, while USA Today, another national newspaper, makes its daily sports section a
prominent feature. These fundamental decisions obviously were choices of editorial
discretion.
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access to political candidates and provide a regular outlet for
elected officials, such as a weekly "Mayor's Report"? Will, in the
end, such systems permit programming that is openly critical of
the local government establishment or that is politically or
culturally unpopular with a majority of the local public?
It seems inconceivable, given cable's contemporary prominence and increased technical and programming sophistication
that, in any municipal cable operation, government decisionmaking will not become intertwined with the editorial process. For
this reason, the public policy and First Amendment issues raised
by municipal ownership of cable television should be examined
and carefully weighed before it is allowed to proceed. In fact,
instead of its virtual encouragement by the 1992 Cable Act,
federal and state law that establishes the permissible parameters of
local government activities should create a presumption against
such ownership in all circumstances where private ownership is
demonstrably available. The First Amendment demands that this
increasingly vital communications service not be so easily
entrusted to local governments.
Moreover, the First Amendment issues posed by municipal
cable ownership are not resolved by Section 533(e)(2) of the 1984
Cable Act.70 That amorphous separate-entity standard, while
acknowledging the need to limit a municipality's ability to control
the form and content of information being provided by the cable
system, does little to protect against the abuses it was designed to
prevent. For example, the standard is so ill-defined that there are
no limitations on the method of selecting the members of the
entity that will exercise this vital editorial function. Nor are there
any restrictions on the ability to remove members. Although the
legislative history states that the entity should be independent,7
no parameters are set to determine when the separate entity is
truly independent. Is it enough that the members appointed by the
franchising authority are not elected officials? May they be
removed at will? At a minimum, it would seem that service on
70. 47 U.S.C. § 533(e)(2) (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
71. H.R. REP,. No. 934, supra note 52, at 58, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4695.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

any such separate entity should be for a set term not subject to
removal (except for good cause) and that the entity should be free
from the regular budget process by some type of guaranteed
appropriation.
The structure of the programming board utilized by the City
of Niceville illustrates the abuses that can occur. There, the board
was not set up until after the City had entered into affiliation
agreements with nineteen program services. Two of its members
were selected by the mayor and one member was selected by each
member of the City Council. The board members were selected to
serve for three year terms-coincidentally, the exact length of the
program affiliation agreements previously entered into by the
City.

72

Thus, the statutory mechanism currently in place to ensure
that the free flow of information is not constricted by government
intervention is woefully inadequate. Any benefits to be achieved
are illusory because the franchising authority has the ability to
maintain extensive controls over the supposedly "separate entity."
The inadequacy of Section 533(e)(2) is further highlighted
when it is recognized that there is no practical method for policing
or monitoring the independence of any editorial board established
by local franchising authorities. There are, in fact, no rules or
regulations, no standards or guidelines, and no required involvement or review by the FCC 73 or any state agency. Rather, in the
absence of a court appeal or declaratory ruling, municipalities are
left to their own devices in ensuring that adequate editorial
independence is maintained. In short, as to matters of editorial
discretion, the guarded and the guardian are one and the same.
As mentioned, the level of concern might be lessened if the
municipality merely were adding its voice to the marketplace.

72. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, at 5-6 n.6, Warner Cable Comm., Inc. v. City of Niceville, 111 S.
Ct. 2839 (1991) (No. 90-1463).
73. The FCC has, in fact, declined to adopt any rules in this area and the question
of enforcement of § 533(e)(2) remains highly uncertain. See Implementation of the
Provisions of the Cable Comm. Policy Act of 1984, Final Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637,
18,647 (1985).
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What, after all, can be wrong with providing potential cable
subscribers with an additional programming choice? 74 The
concern, however, is far more substantial if the end result of
municipal ownership will be to drive an existing private cable
operator out of business-thereby constricting the free flow of
information.
The cable system proposed by the City of Niceville is again
illustrative of the problems that arise as a result of competitive
municipal ownership. When the City announced its intention to
build a competitive system, the incumbent private provider argued
that the City had certain inherent advantages resulting from its
dual role as regulator and competitor that would give the City an
unfair competitive advantage.7 - More than that, the existing
operator demonstrated why the City's action would ultimately
drive its system out of business.76
For example, the incumbent's system was required to pay 5
percent of its gross revenues to the City as a franchise fee. The
City's system would not." Similarly, the City's system would not
be subject to the property, sales, and income taxes that the
incumbent operator is required to pay.78 Furthermore, the City
would be able to cross-subsidize its system by resorting to general
municipal funds and to pledge tax revenues in order to raise
capital, advantages obviously unavailable to the private provider.79 In addition, as a result of the tax-favored treatment of

74. It should be emphasized, however, that 47 U.S.C. § 531 of the 1984 Act gives
local governments ample authority to add their own voices to privately-owned systems
by virtue of mandated public, educational, or government (PEG) channels. Not only may
municipalities require and use such dedicated channels, private operators are specifically
precluded from exercising any editorial control over the use of such channels. 47 U.S.C.
§ 531(e) (1988).
75. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit at 2, 6, Warner Cable Comm., Inc. v. City of Niceville, 111 S. Ct.
2839 (1991) (No. 90-1463).
76. See id. at 7.
77. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the National Cable TV Ass'n, Inc., in Support of
Petitioner at 3, Warner Cable Comm., Inc. v. City of Niceville, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991)
(No. 90-1463).

78. Id.
79. Id.
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municipal bonds, the City would be able to borrow funds for
construction at significantly lower rates of interest."0
The advantages flowing to a municipally-owned system are
perhaps even more pronounced in their ability to directly regulate
a competitive private provider. The power to renew the franchise
of the private operator and now, under the 1992 Act, to regulate
the private operator's rates, puts the municipally-owned system at
a distinct competitive advantage. Moreover, enabling municipalities to operate their own systems free of the extensive franchising
requirements that they can impose on private operators,"1 and, at
the same time, affording them a statutory exemption from damage
liability, 82 greatly increases that advantage.
These provisions not only have the potential for elevating
government speech over private speech, they also impermissibly
place government in the position of competing against the very
private cable operators whose prices they control (and part of
whose capacity they regulate), creating the potential for abuse of
regulatory power for both political and economic purposes.
Empowering government to play an inherently conflicting role as
a regulator and a favored player among cable operators distorts
both the economic marketplace and the marketplace of ideas.8 3
Thus, municipalities seeking to operate their own cable
systems have both the incentives and the means to control-and
even to eliminate-any private competition. In light of the
increasingly important role that cable plays as the provider of local
news and programming, one must seriously question the wisdom
of permitting direct governmental control over cable communications--either on an exclusive or competitive basis-when a private
provider is ready and able to supply such service. As one

80. Id. at 3 n.1.
81. 47 U.S.C.A. § 541(f) (West Supp. 1993).
82. 47 U.S.C.A. § 555a (West Supp. 1993).
83. "Among the 'evils to be prevented' by the first amendment press guarantee are
'not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of
which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters.... ."' P.A.M.
News Corp. v. Butz, 514 F.2d 272, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1936)).
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respected commentator has noted: "[O]ne of the necessary
conditions for freedom of the press is the absence of government
attempts to replace the private sector press with a government
84
press.
CONCLUSION

As shown, although Congress authorized municipal ownership
in the 1984 Act, it did so with at least some recognition of the
sensitive First Amendment issues involved. It was, moreover,
taking such action in an environment where cable growth and
deregulation were being strongly encouraged.
In eight short years, times and circumstances have certainly
changed. Now, cable is a mature medium whose influence and
practices are thought to warrant significant curbing. As a result, in
an effort to rein in cable and spur the growth of competitive
services, the 1992 Act fails to even address the First Amendment
issues brought about by the enlarged media role of cable and the
more active participation of municipalities.
While it might be said that the increased powers vested in
local franchising authorities by the 1992 Act85 may ultimately
inhibit new efforts at municipal ownership, the potential for
government abuse remains. By making municipal ownership easier
and the leverage local authorities may exert over private operators
greater, cities can rely on the threat of inaugurating a governmentowned system to instigate changes and secure promises they might
not otherwise obtain.86
84. See John E. Nowak, Using The Press Clause to Limit Government Speech, 30
ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 15 (1988).
85. See supra notes 44-46, 55-57 and accompanying text.
86. Even before the 1992 Cable Act bestowed new powers, cities had become
increasingly adroit at using this type of leverage. For example, if certain program
decisions or other changes undertaken by a private operator displeased local officials,
and a franchise renewal was on the horizon, it was increasingly likely that such officials
would attempt to flex their municipal muscle by holding out the prospect of operating
a subsidized public cable system as an indirect method of bringing about desired changes
on the private system. It is increasingly likely that many private operators will be facing
renewal more frequently, given the trend toward shorter franchise renewal terms and the
36-month statutory window for initiating the formal renewal process. See 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 546(a) (West Supp. 1993).
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Given a choice, cable communications should be provided by
private sources, not government sources. This is especially so in
smaller but significant communities where the only video outlet is
the local cable system-that is, the thousands of communities
across the country large enough to support radio stations or
newspapers (daily or weekly) but not over-the-air television.87
Our country's tradition of a free press is founded upon a recognition that the government should assume a neutral stance in the
provision of general media services. Accordingly, any scheme that
sanctions direct governmental ownership and control of a vital
communications medium must, at a minimum, be preceded by a
determination of whether there are any realistic, less threatening
alternatives to governmental ownership and control, in given
circumstances.
Furthermore, this issue should not be resolved by merely
attempting to separate the editorial function from other municipal
functions. When a municipality or other local government
authority is permitted to own and control the local cable system,
it is unrealistic to assume, whatever mechanisms are constructed,
that government officials will not exercise some influence over
decisions that affect such basic matters as what programs and
services will be provided over the system. While the "editorial"
choices may have been limited in years past when cable systems
had only a twelve-channel capacity, this clearly is no longer the
case. Today's cable operator, regardless of channel capacity and
subscriber base, makes a wide range of ongoing "editorial"
decisions. Technological developments that promise to introduce
87. Indeed, Paragould, Arkansas; Niceville, Florida; and Morganton, North Carolina,
all hotbeds of recent municipal overbuild activity, see supra part I.B., are just such
communities, having a sufficiently large population and economic base to support local
radio and newspaper media, but not large enough to sustain a local television station,
leaving cable as the only video communications medium. See EDITOR & PUBLISHER
YEARBOOK 1993,1-21,1-273, 11-13; BROADCASTING AND CABLE YEARBOOK 1993, B-27,
B-78, B-262, C-1 10. Paragould supports a daily newspaper, The ParagouldDailyPress,
and three radio stations-KDRS (AM), KLQZ (FM), and KDXY (FM); Morganton
supports a daily newspaper as well, The News Herald, a low-power television station
(W23AN), and three radio stations-WCIS (AM), WMNC (AM) and WQXX (FM);
Niceville supports a weekly paper, The Bayou Times, and a license has been granted to
WNCV (FM) (not yet on the air; target date unknown).
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hundreds of channels and facilitate direct "interactivity" between
operators and subscribers on most modem cable systems can only
magnify and expand the nature of those decisions. 8
In sum, Section 533(e) is outmoded and should be replaced
by a provision that would permit municipal ownership and control
only as a last resort. Instead of affirmatively sanctioning municipal
ownership in almost any circumstance, federal communications
law should discourage municipal ownership in order to preserve
a healthy separation between the local government establishment
and the video communications that are delivered directly into the
homes of local viewers. Recent changes in the nature of cable
television service and today's burgeoning video marketplace
demand this type of policy reversal.
Only in circumstances where no private provider of cable
communications services is available should municipal ownership
and control be permitted. This determination should be made in a
public proceeding conducted along the same lines as the existing
franchise process--or even as part of the franchise process. For
example, if a local government contemplated building its own new
cable system, it should nevertheless be required to invite proposals
by all interested parties. Only if a private party did not come
forward and demonstrate its ability to construct an initial system
could the municipal government proceed to build and operate its
own new system. The same process and standard should apply
where the municipal authority decides to revoke or deny the
franchise of an existing private provider-that is, it should not be
permitted to award itself a franchise until and unless it is first
determined that such replacement service would not or could not
be supplied by a private provider. 89 In other words, if an inde88. See, e.g., John Flinn, The Future Rises in Castro Valley, CABLEVISION, Oct. 18,
1993, at 42; Peter Lambert, TCI's $1.9 Billion Pledgefor Superhighway,MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Apr. 19, 1993, at 1; Michael W. Miller, Tomorrow's TV May Make You a
Viewer-Doer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993, at B1; The 500-Channel UniverseAccording
to Cox's Dalvi, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, July 19, 1993, at 1.
89. Under this new statutory structure, it would not be possible for a local
government to authorize both a private system and its own competitive government
system. It could, however, as now, request proposals and grant franchises for competitive
private systems. In short, it could either be a "regulator" or a "last-resort" operator, but
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pendent, non-government party stood ready and willing to build,
operate, or acquire a particular system, the franchising authority
would be barred from ownership.
Finally, even in circumstances where a municipality qualified
as the "provider of last resort," operational control would have to
be placed in the hands of a separate, non-governmental management company or special purpose public corporation sufficiently
insulated from either arbitrary termination or the policy whims of
local government officials. Unlike Section 533(e)(2), which merely
requires "separation" of the "editorial" function, without defining
either term, the law should require the entire cable functionoperational and editorial-to be performed by a clearly autonomous governmental unit. Moreover, standards for such separation
should be set by the Federal Communications Commission or an
appropriate state regulatory body, and citizens and other interested
parties should have a right to contest the implementation of such
standards by local franchising authorities.
With these steps, Congress could more clearly preserve the
important First Amendment principles plainly recognized to be at
stake in these circumstances. Without such action, or without other
changes instituted by the states or imposed by the courts,9" it is
likely that more and more municipalities will elect to operate cable
systems in lieu of regulating cable systems. This role reversal
would represent a decidedly unhealthy development for First
Amendment principles long recognized to be at the heart of
communications public policymaking in this country.

it could not be an "operator-regulator" in circumstances where private service is feasible.
90. In the absence of congressional action to change § 533(e), state legislatures are
clearly empowered to act on their own in both restricting municipalities from entering
the mass media business and taking steps to ensure that if such activities are indeed
permitted, a clear and convincing separation is maintained between the local political
structure, and the agency or entity entrusted with the operation of the cable system.

